Tactical Response

Discussion in 'Training & Safety' started by AFerree, Oct 22, 2013.

  1. AFerree

    AFerree New Member

    Does anyone have any experience at Tactical Response and/or James Yeager? I've head only good things about them and seriously considering taking fighting pistol or way if the pistol.
  2. Overkill0084

    Overkill0084 Active Member

    More than a few people share the opinion that James Yeager is something of an opinionated blowhard. I tend to concur just judging by what I've seen on YouTube. YMMV.
    I cannot comment as to the quality of the training from the company, however.
    Last edited: Oct 22, 2013

  3. Rentacop

    Rentacop Active Member

    Here's a link to a discussion of Yeager and his Iraq adventures :
    C:\Users\Doug\Documents\James Yeager AArs.mht

    I have his " Fighting Pistol " DVD set and give it high marks .
    Last edited: Nov 1, 2013
  4. wittmeba

    wittmeba New Member


    No one can see any files on your pc. You need to post on a website if you want to share it.

    C:\Users\Doug\Documents\James Yeager AArs.mht
  5. Rentacop

    Rentacop Active Member

    Sorry, I'll try to provide the info :




    On 20 April 2005 Edinburgh Risk personnel assigned to Operation APOLLO (support to the Independent Election Commission of Iraq) were engaged by enemy forces on Route IRISH (BIAP Road) during the execution of their duties.

    Post incident Edinburgh Risk, in keeping with company policy and operational SOP's, conducted a full deliberate review conducted by an external assessor of the incident along with corresponding verbal and written AAR's. The assessor for this review was the Group's USA Managing Director. He has extensive operational experience in the military and as a civilian contactor/ operator. Having spent August 2003 to December 2004 in Baghdad, he is well familiar with the specific challenges posed by the insurgency in Iraq.

    This report is the only official Edinburgh Risk report in regards to the incident.


    The overall aim of this report is to identify friendly and enemy action during the contact in order to extract lessons identified that may be applicable to current and future operations.


    Phase 1 - Pre-mission orders: Prior to the move, during the evening Order's Group 19 April 05, a warning order was issued to members of the APOLLO team who would be conducting a road move to BIAP in order to pick up operators coming in from rotation. Instructions were issued in accordance with a standard military warning order with additional discussion conducted in regards to the teams SOP for dealing with the VBIED/IED threat on Route IRISH. In order to mitigate the threat of IED/VBIED attack the team was in the process of instituting a number of SOP'S in regards to the use of new operational methods to help mitigate the threat. The team reviewed video footage taken of Route IRISH during previous moves in order to identify choke points, danger areas and likely areas of enemy attack. The team was also concerned with blue on blue incidents and stressed the need to be prepared to identify themselves as required so as to avoid blue on blue with Coalition or other PSC's operating on Route IRISH.

    Phase Two- Mission Orders: On the morning of 20 April 05 the team task organized for the days move and met to conduct an Operations Group. The O Group was conducted utilizing the standard 5 paragraph Op Order format. All operators were present for the order. The detail leader, Allan Johnson, conducted the O group utilizing video footage, again, to identify danger areas and to brief the team's scheme of maneuver during the movement. Alternatively Simon Merry and Steph Surett briefed with the drivers in regards to the route and actions on when approaching danger areas, coalition or other PSC call signs. Orders were conducted from 1100 hours to 1130 hours. At approximately 1130 hours the team mustered for their final inspections and departed for BIAP.

    Phase Three- Movement: The team was task organized as follows:

    Lead/Advance Vehicle consisting of Soft Skin BMW Sedan
    James Yeager - Driver
    Steph Surette - Vehicle IC
    Mark Collen - Rear Gunner (medic)

    Center/Main Body B6 Armored Mercedes
    Driver- Simon Merry
    Vehicle IC- Ian Harris (mission 2 IC)

    Rear/Follow Vehicle consisting of Soft Skin BMW Sedan

    Driver - Chris Ahmelmen
    Vehicle IC - Allan Johnson (overall mission commander)
    Rear Gunner - James (Jay) Hunt

    The team departed through Gate 12 at approximately 1140 after linking in with the Ops Room where they dropped off their route and mission card with Edinburgh Risk Ops. The team also contacted the ROC to check on the status of Route IRISH and the ROC informed them that the route was open.

    Team movement was going according to plan until the team reached RV 5. RV 5 was assigned as the last foot bridge/flyover heading west just prior to the checkpoint leading into BIAP/VICTORY.

    As the team reached RV5, traffic was coming to a halt and the team was halted just beneath or just outside of RV5 with the main body vehicle coming to a halt just beneath the foot bridge. The team was halted at approximately 1155 hrs.

    Traffic to the front was halted due to Coalition Forces closing the road in response to an incident on the road. The team estimates that Coalition Forces were located 300-400 meters to the front of their position while halted at RV 5.

    During the halt the team reports that there were approximately 10 local national vehicles to their front which cleared the area by either driving back down towards traffic and utilizing a slip road to leave the area or by crossing the median and traveling down the alternate lane of travel.

    Al Johnson called for the team to move forward in order to create depth between the motorcade and local national vehicles to the rear as well as to take them out from under the foot bridge/fly over which was deemed to be a threat as it presented a danger area due to the possibility of attack from above.

    The motorcade moved forward approximately 300 meters giving the rear gunner, Jay Hunt, in the rear vehicle enough clearance to cover the foot bridge with fire if required whilst also allowing the team to cover and close the slip road located to the right front of the motorcade so as to prevent enemy attack from that location.

    At this time the three vehicles are spaced at approximately 100 meters between vehicles with the motorcade occupying an area estimated to be 300-400 meters in length from the front vehicle to the rear vehicle.

    During the halt Al Johnson and Ian Harris discuss crossing the median in order to leave an area where they feel they are exposed. The decision is made not to cross the median as they are concerned that the vehicles will not clear the obstacle presented by the median.

    While the team was halted Mark Collen identified a suspect vehicle along the slip road to the right flank, north, of the motorcade at a distance of approximately 500 meters. He took the vehicle under surveillance utilizing a scope mounted upon his M4. He observed one local national male in the vehicle and noted that the vehicle occupant was not paying the call sign any attention and seemed to be concentrating his attention on local national traffic halted to the suspect vehicles front. He assessed that the suspect vehicle was not a threat and informed the team accordingly.

    The team remained static for approximately ten minutes while it waited to see if Coalition Forces would open the road. At approximately 1200-1210 Al Johnson made the decision to abandon the position and was in the process of ordering the team to move when the team came under intense automatic weapons fire.

    Phase Four- Contact: As stated at approximately 1210 hrs, the APOLLO team was engaged with heavy automatic weapons fire which originated from north of their position along the slip road bordering Route IRISH. All three vehicles sustained damage and casualties during the initial burst of gun fire. It is assessed that the team was engaged by two or more PKM belt fed GPMG firing armor piercing ammunition. The armored sedan suffered hits which would have normally defeated standard ball ammunition. During the initial burst of gun fire the APOLLO team suffered three casualties which consisted of Jay Hunt, Chris Ahmlemen, and Steff Surette. Two of the operators Jay Hunt and Steff Surette were wounded in the hip/groin area and suffered sever trauma to the femoral artery while Chris Ahmlemen was shot in the hip and head with the head wound killing him outright.

    Upon the initiation of contact the lead vehicle driven by James Yeager attempted to drive out of the kill zone and was unsuccessful as Yeager had taken the car out of drive placing it in neutral and setting the emergency hand brake which prevented him from driving out of the kill zone during the opening stages of the contact. Upon failing to drive "off the X" Yeager, Mark Collen and Steff Surette evacuated the vehicle. Steff Surette at this point was already wounded and was located beside the vehicle in the prone though he was attempting to remain in the fight. James Yeager fell to the rear of the vehicle in order to return fire and engage enemy forces. According to James Yeager he could not identify enemy forces and thus he attempted to suppress the general vicinity of where he suspected enemy fire was coming from. After having fired an estimated half a magazine of ammunition out of his M4 Yeager broke contact from the rear of his vehicle and maneuvered to the median to the south of the engagement area. Mark Collen also positioned at the rear of the vehicle identified enemy forces firing from a white suburban vehicle and engaged the white suburban with approximately 100 rounds of 5.56 from his M249 Minimi. He then experienced a stoppage and switched to his M4 with which he continued to engage the enemy forces located within the white suburban. The white suburban drove out of sight and at that point Mark Collen provided immediate medical care to Steff Surette.

    Concurrently vehicle two, the armored sedan attempted to first maneuver to its front in order to provide cover to vehicle one. Simon Merry, driver of vehicle two, reported that the car was unresponsive as it had suffered damage during the initial burst of GPMG fire which caused catastrophic damage to the transmission. Ian Harris, IC of vehicle two, exited the vehicle as the vehicle was under heavy fire. He then maneuvered to the front bonnet of vehicle one so as to provide suppressive fire in support of the team. Ian was able to identify enemy forces located within the white suburban and fired semi-automatic, well aimed fire into the rear of the vehicle. Ian reported that his fire seemed to be "bouncing off" the rear of the vehicle and, upon interviewing other team members who took the suburban under fire, they believe that the suburban was armored as their fire had little or no effect on the enemy vehicle. Ian came under severe enemy fire whilst he attempted to suppress enemy forces but he continued the attempt to win the firefight. After attempting to move the vehicle forward in support of vehicle one Simon Merry attempted to move the vehicle to the rear to provide cover for vehicle three but again, the vehicle was unresponsive. Simon Merry then exited the vehicle and positioned himself to the rear of the vehicle in order to provide covering fire to vehicle three. Simon in accordance with team SOP'S deployed a smoke grenade to the north of the motorcade in order to mask the callsign.

    Vehicle three occupied by Al Johnson, Chris Ahmlemen, and Jay Hunt was engaged as well during the initial burst of GPMG fire with Chris Ahmelmen, the driver, being killed - thus the vehicle remained static. Jay Hunt who was hit in the initial burst attempted to evacuate the vehicle and take enemy forces under fire but was almost immediately out of the fight due to the nature of his wounds. Al Johnson the vehicle IC evacuated the vehicle in order to try and treat Jay Hunt and Chris Ahmlemen. He moved Jay Hunt to a position of cover behind the left front tire of the vehicle and then moved to treat Chris Ahmlemen who was by then deceased. He then returned to treat Jay Hunt who was hit in the femoral artery.

    The initial contact lasted 32 seconds in accordance with the video footage taken from a dash mounted camera in vehicle three. Within that 32 seconds three operators were combat ineffective due to enemy fire and related wounds and all three vehicles were disabled either through mechanical failure and/or driver errors and wounds. All three vehicles were taken under fire almost simultaneously which leads to the belief that there was more than one enemy element engaging the motorcade though only one enemy element was ever identified by the members of the team. The volume of enemy fire and the consistency and accuracy of that fire in relation to a callsign that was spread out over three hundred meters indicates either a very proficient enemy operator or the presence of more than one GPMG during the contact.

    Enemy forces engaged the motorcade for no more than one minute and ten seconds at which point they had evacuated the engagement area.

    Upon disengagement with enemy forces the team consolidated its position with Mark Collen and Al Johnson continuing to provide medical treatment to Jay Hunt and Steff Surette while the rest of the team provided 360 degree security.

    Phase Five- Consolidation: Simon Merry signaled to Coalition Forces (CF) who were located three hundred meters to their front (west of the contact area) who responded to the signals by approaching the engagement area slowly with three Humvees. Concurrently James Yeager left his position at the median and moved to vehicle three in order to provide close in support and security to Al Johnson who was still attempting to treat Jay Hunt. While, at the rear of vehicle three, Yeager engaged a local national vehicle that was attempting to move into the engagement area from the east on Route IRISH. Believing this to be a possible VBIED, Yeager fired two shots into the vehicle at which point the vehicle stopped and did not attempt to move any closer into the engagement area.

    At this point Coalition Forces had reached vehicle one with Ian Harris providing them an immediate sit-rep as to the situation while asking for CF support in order to evacuate the casualties. CF took command of the scene and instructed Ian Harris to police up team members, equipment and vehicles that were mobile and evacuate the scene. They instructed the team to move to Camp VICTORY where CF would evacuate the wounded team members to the Camp VICTORY Aid Station.

    Ian Harris rallied the surviving team members and loaded into vehicle's one, two and three. Vehicle two was un-serviceable and thus abandoned. Al Johnson stayed with CF forces and was still treating Jay Hunt along with a CF medic at this point. Al Johnson was hit in the buttocks during the engagement but continued to remain behind in order to insure that CF treated and evacuated the wounded/dead. Ian Harris evacuated the team with vehicles one and three departing for the CASH at Camp VICTORY.

    During the consolidation and preparation for evacuation a call sign from Olive Security approached the motorcade from the east on Route IRISH arriving at vehicle three and interfaced with Al Johnson and James Yeager. Olive offered assistance to the team and, due to the fact that CF forces had run out of room within their FLA, Olive evacuated the body of Chris Ahmlemen along with some team equipment. Olive proceeded to Camp VICTORY meeting Edinburgh Risk call signs at the check point leading into BIAP/VICTORY and instructed the team to follow them into VICTORY as they had the body and equipment with them. Al Johnson had been loaded onto the CF FLA and moved to the CASH at VICTORY via the CF FLA. Olive remained with the APOLLO team at the CASH and continued their support. At the CASH, Chris Ahmelmen and Jay Hunt were pronounced dead and Steff Surette was undergoing treatment during which he died. Al Johnson continued to stay with the casualties until he was ordered by the military to receive treatment. The remaining team members consolidated all equipment and personnel and returned to Edinburgh Risk HQ located within the International Zone. Support was provided to the remaining members of the call sign for this move by Edinburgh Risk's Operation Hermes and continued support from Olive.


    Given the nature of the contact, the violence of action executed by a capable enemy force and the volume of enemy fire levied upon the team during the initiation of the contact, the team responded as well as could be expected under the circumstances. Without doubt, this was a highly capable and well rehearsed group of insurgents initiating a deliberate ambush.

    Retrospectively, the team should not have remained static for a protracted period of time in a canalized area such as Route IRISH. It is understandable that the team tried to create depth between themselves and local national traffic due to the threat of VBIED on the BIAP road. Inadvertently, this maneuver also resulted in the team unmasking from the concealment provided by low profile saloon vehicles within the main body of local traffic. During the debrief the team acknowledged the fact that they were static in one location for too long a time however they also state that they were in the process of leaving the area when enemy contact was initiated - it is possible that the enemy deliberately waited for this moment to initiate the contact.

    Actions during the contact itself were conducted in accordance with the team SOP. The team attempted to drive out of the kill zone but this action was precluded due to operator error for vehicle one and mechanical failure due to enemy fire with vehicles two and three. Upon failing to extract by vehicle the operators evacuated the vehicles and established a base of fire in order to suppress enemy forces so as to then be able to break contact as required. The fact that the team suffered 50 percent casualties in the initial volley of fire detracted from their ability to sufficiently suppress the enemy thus also negating their ability to then break contact. James Yeager in accordance with the team SOP attempted to break contact in the opening stages of the contact yet fire superiority and or suppression had at that time not been established. Ian Harris and Mark Collen, each under heavy enemy fire, were the only two individuals during the contact who attempted to suppress enemy forces. Simon Merry was continuing to try to maneuver his vehicle to a position of support to vehicle one and then two whilst Al Johnson was busily treating multiple casualties at his location with vehicle three. James Yeager was in a location at the median where he could not engage enemy forces as he did no have a line of fire from his location. Ian Harris as team 2 IC provided leadership to the team through the use of verbal commands and fire control while the team leader, Al Johnson attended to the wounded personnel from his vehicle. Ian Harris, with assistance from Coalition Forces and Olive Security, consolidated the team and evacuated the area.


    Many of the lessons identified are well known but it is worth reiterating them:

    " If forced to go static on Route IRISH (or any route for that matter) teams need to act in accordance with SOP and immediately evacuate the area.
    " If enemy forces initiate fire it is imperative that the team under fire first establish fire superiority prior to breaking contact. It is imperative that team members who have eyes on the enemy call out fire direction, distance and description so as to alert other team members to the enemy location. You can not maneuver until you have established an aggressive base of fire.
    " Team Leaders should have no additional duties other than that of team leader.
    " Crew Served Weapons must be kept running during the course of the fight. If one goes down due to a wounded or killed operator then that weapon must be immediately put back into action by another team member.
    " Every move needs to include at a minimum one weapons system utilizing 7.62 NATO in order to defeat enemy forces employing hard and soft skin vehicles.


    PSCs have experienced countless attacks on Route IRISH as well as on other MSRs within Iraq. PSCs, while having the ability to defend themselves and their clients to a degree, will only be as successful as the conditions established by Coalition and Iraqi security forces. The fact that enemy forces can mass and execute operations in the vicinity of Route IRISH as well as throughout Iraq is a testament to the current conditions within Iraq. PSCs, in order to operate successfully, must swim in a sea of security established by "green army". If general security is not established by Coalition and Local National security forces to a degree that precludes the enemy's ability to operate in strength across Iraq then PSC'S and their clients will continue to become a collateral target of an insurgency that operates with impunity.

    Signed on Original

    Christopher Farina
    Managing Director
    Edinburgh Risk and Security Management
    Reston, Virginia
    “Let your plans be dark and as impenetrable as the night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.” — Sun Tzu

    General Comments: Operation Apollo
    James Yeager May 25th, 2005
    Mission Focus
    Our mission is the protection of the eight Iraqi Election Commissioners. As we all know
    these are high priority targets. If one or all of them were killed, especially during the preelection
    period, it would have potentially destabilized the entire country even further.
    Many times our team leaders referred to it as a “resume builder” and said we were a part
    of a “historical event”.
    Our team leaders feel our clients are a nuisance. One example of the day to day failure of
    our team leaders is the simple task of manning our team at the Interim Iraqi Government
    Building. We do it every day and we never have a team leader up here. This is the most
    prime target we operate in and we never get a team leader up here. Leadership is always
    handed off to an operator while all of our other team leaders do other things, every single
    day. I was a team leader during a 30 day break and I took over for Johno. I asked if I
    could be the “IIGB Team Leader” for the month and work it every day. They refused and
    said “Team Leaders don’t belong there.”
    We have a team here EVERY day along with our EIGHT clients and it is not important?
    Operation Apollo has no written S.O.P.s for wearing body armor, weapons maintenance,
    tactics or anything else relevant, but we have S.O.P.s for “fraternization” and “Haji
    Dress”. This is inexcusable, reckless, and above all an indicator of our lack of leadership.
    If the individual teams will not write S.O.P.s then ERSM should hand them a set to abide
    by. As a new operator coming fresh onto a project how are you supposed to know what
    all the other operators are going to do? You won’t.
    Operation Apollo has no Leaders. Operation Apollo has no Administrators. Is there even
    a formal written job description for Project Managers and Team Leaders? There cannot
    be! We have Fred Lynch as a PM and he goes on every “cool guy” mission and we have
    no one left to do administration. Admin duties get passed around this project constantly
    to lower team members who do not get Team Leader pay. Team leaders are
    micromanaged by Lynch. I cannot say enough bad things about Fred Lynch. If I were to
    cover his incompetence the book would be larger than The Odyssey.
    I would like there to be a thorough and formal review of all CVs and résumé’s that have
    been submitted by ALL members of this project. I doubt their validity and allowing them
    to continue is negligent. I can assure you we have some outright LIARS when it comes to
    past deeds and qualifications.
    I would like every member of this project to be tested for steroids, hashish, marijuana,
    valium, cocaine, and ecstasy. Drug use is rampant on this project including within certain
    members of our command staff.
    Our clients were gone for virtually and entire month after the election. Did we use that
    time for much needed training? No, our team saw fit to build a BAR at our house and
    party all night long with every drunk they could invite virtually every night for a month.
    One night the music lasted until 0635. I had to be ready for work at 0800. As soon as I
    got off work I had to go on a BIAP run because over 50% of our team was mission
    incapable because they were hung over and or asleep. I had just gotten back from the
    U.S. the day before and hadn’t slept. I went on a BIAP run because I was the most able
    and I hadn’t had sleep for nearly 48 hours.
    It still happens, even now, 3-4 nights a week. We have a bunch of alcoholics on our team.
    • The recent craze with short barreled M-4s is foolish. No American ammunition
    manufacturer recommends a barrel shorter than 11.5. It reduces the velocity far
    too much to be effective. You can find plenty of info on-line.
    • I have heard “We don’t need this and we don’t need that.” Tell me when I am
    going to be in a gunfight and I won’t go but don’t tell me what I need and don’t
    • We have no Armorers and no spare parts for any of the guns. If a part breaks it
    will take weeks to get replacement parts.
    • SAWs and GPMGs are not implemented correctly on the team. We have been told
    we don’t need them. People need to be trained and they should be put into proper
    • Operators who carry AKs with folded stocks should unfold them when they are
    being used.
    • Pistol gripped shotguns are far more popular here than they should be. They are
    totally useless and anyone who thinks they aren’t should take one to the range and
    try it out. When you actually shoot and train with gun you figure these things out.
    • Guys collapse their stocks on the M-4s and leave them collapsed. They should be
    adjust for fighting and left alone. The constant collapsing and opening is
    • Some personnel cannot unload their guns fast enough after missions. Why? A fear
    of loaded guns should be overcome long before someone comes to Iraq.
    Other Theater’s of Operation
    We have people from Britain, Canada, Australia, America, and South Africa on our
    team. Many have had experience in hostile environments prior to coming to Iraq. But I
    could care less about the people who fought against the IRA in Northern Ireland. We are
    in Iraq in case someone didn’t notice and whatever a person did some other place simply
    isn’t relevant. I was a Cop in “Pig Knuckle” Tennessee and I have never mentioned it. Do
    you know why? It isn’t relevant. Last time I checked The IRA and Northern Ireland is no
    success story and I wouldn’t be resting my laurels on a group of people who’s operators
    where suspected to be less than 200 at the height of their insurrection. More bombs go off
    in Iraq in one day that the IRA set off in 30 years. Even Afghanistan has no relation to
    what is going on here. There are guys here who were in Beirut during the 1980s and say
    it was child’s play compared to Iraq. We need to get out of the past and get into THIS
    General Mindset of Apollo Team Leaders
    I was told by Fred lynch “It isn’t your job to motivate people. It’s mine.” If you listed
    every trait that made someone a good leader he would be the exact opposite of that. He is
    a “yes man” to his superiors and a “no man” to his subordinates.
    The team was told by Tom Powell to carry un-zeroed and unfired M-4s on Election Day.
    When we protested he told us “Don’t worry. The Army will protect you.” He said this
    just after he found out he was named in the Blackwater lawsuit for allegedly playing a
    part in the liabilities that led to the deaths of his 4 operators in Fallujah. He is apparently
    playing some part in the new ERSM training facility in Florida since I fired him from my
    company as soon as I found out he was a fraud. He also absconded with all of my training
    materials which are copyrighted so I am sure they won’t end up in any ERSM classes.
    Rob Lister is a good man but when he was placed into the crew of unqualified leaders he
    just blended right in to the group. He knew the things he was seeing were wrong but he
    was not motivated or dedicated enough to make them right. That makes him a failure.
    Bob Graham is illiterate, incompetent, insubordinate, insecure, inhumane to our staff,
    and indifferent to the team’s problems. I would ask that he be thrown out of Iraq but I am
    afraid he might go back to the U.S. and breed.
    I was told by Stu Senior that this job isn’t about carrying machine guns and playing “G.I.
    Joe” it is about lighting a cigarette for your client. Did anyone check his references?
    Every time I meet one of his former co-workers they want to know where he is so they
    can kill him.
    I sent an article out to all the e-mails I have for ERSM employees. It was essentially
    about sheep, wolves, and sheep dogs and about Warrior Mindset. Crispian Cuss, the
    Operations Director sent a one word response and said the article was “Drivel”. I think
    that sets the ERSM corporate tone for the importance of a fighting Mindset. Yesterday
    he sent me an insulting e-mail about my incident report saying it was a “fantasy” and
    needed a rewrite. Is insulting people who lay their life on the line for your company a
    standard S.O.P. or did he make that one up just for me? I expect more out of a senior
    corporate representative of the company.
    I despise people who only complain and never offer solutions. In that spirit I am going to
    put my money where my mouth is. After I take a short break when I go home I will come
    back and train all of the in-country ERSM operators with a full shooting and tactics
    package (about ten days per team) for free for as long as it takes. The number of projects
    you have multiplied by 10 days is how long I will stay with no questions asked. I will pay
    my own airfare and all I ask is a roof over my head for the time I am training.
    I do not have all the answers but I do have a few and I would be honored if ERSM took
    me up on my offer.
    Respectfully Submitted,
    James Yeager
  6. Rentacop

    Rentacop Active Member

  7. Axxe55

    Axxe55 The Apocalypse Is Coming.....

    after his violent rant and tirade last year, i have not the least in any respect for him or his opinions. he comes off as an arrogant ***** who thinks only his opinions matter.

    now whether his training is any good or not is totally irrelevent to me, as i wuldn't want to be around such a person of his nature for more than about five minutes. life is too short to have to hang around with jerks.
  8. mountainman13

    mountainman13 New Member

    Jesus h Christ.
    How about a condensed debriefing?
  9. GTX63

    GTX63 New Member

    Interesting read.
  10. Garadex

    Garadex New Member

    Did you really read the whole thing? :confused: If so, holy crap!
  11. AR10

    AR10 New Member

    Big money can contribute to an attitude.

    His least expensive class is $450. He personally taught over 4,000 students last year. Do the math.

    His tirade did exactly what he wanted it to do, brought attention to his you tube channel. He took in over two million dollars last year in class fees. He has 8 additional instructors, plus his retail sales.

    Yeager is laughing all the way to the bank.

    He just put out a video about loving the haters. He figures he makes over a million dollars a year on hate posts as he calls them, in forums like this. Someone popular posts a negative post, and forum members go watch his videos to check him out.

    I personally think his bark is to get attention. If he had boobs, he would be wearing a Victoria's secret push up bra on camera.

    If you step over his arrogance, wander past his sometimes dumb side (we all say dumb things sometimes) he has 500 pretty good videos on gun knowledge.

    I disagree on his stance for 9 and 45 as the only good choices for pistols. I carry 10s and 40s and 357sigs.

    I agree the best fighting pistol is a Glock.

    I agree Glocks should have all original internal parts

    I think Yeager can be interesting to watch, informative,

    I think he will end up in a fema camp if he is lucky, or more likely a mass grave when the fight starts. He is working towards a confrontation, and all people like this, usually get what they are looking for.
  12. AR10

    AR10 New Member

    Figure axxes comment will make Yeager a few thousand dollars over the next year's. He appreciates that.
  13. GTX63

    GTX63 New Member

    Lol, yeah I did. Slow day in the office that morning.
  14. Garadex

    Garadex New Member

    Haha, I know what ya mean.
  15. LeMat

    LeMat New Member

    That pretty much sums it up for me.
  16. DrFootball

    DrFootball disappointed & disgusted, But DETERMINED... Lifetime Supporter

    Guess you never wrote an AA(After Action) report. I have had to on a few instances. That one was reasonably short.... While i do not nec. agree with all of his points, The training is valid in todays' market,..even if he's a bit "self Centered" There are plenty of good instructors out there that are on Utube...Like Rob Pincus and the PDN(Personal Defense Network). Plus plenty of big schools like Gunsite (very local to me) & Front Sight in Vegas..
    Take a Class at either, and your a better prepared Person...
    Last edited: Nov 18, 2013
  17. Rentacop

    Rentacop Active Member

    " I personally think his bark is to get attention. If he had boobs, he would be wearing a Victoria's secret push up bra on camera. "

    In today's society, the above could actually happen !!!!!!
  18. Rentacop

    Rentacop Active Member

    The version of events posted earlier was was from ERSM . Here is Yeagers personal AAR :
    Here is Yeager's AAR

    BIAP 4.20.2005

    The Ambush of Edinburgh Risk and Security Management's Operation Apollo

    Prepared: April 22nd, 2005 by James Yeager Job Title: Operator Rank: None
    Contact: JamesYeager@TacticalResponse.com

    Orders were at 1100hrs Baghdad local time (+9 CST) on April 20th, 2005.
    We had our typical set of orders covering the aspects of the trip. We have
    heard them so many times we can all most likely recite them while asleep.
    Team leaders Al "Johno" Johnson and Stef Surette gave the mission briefing.
    We were going to Baghdad International Airport (aka BIAP) to pick up two
    ERSM employees, one of which was an Operation Apollo team member.

    Vehicle One: Black unarmored BMW manual transmission Driver: James Yeager,
    Primary weapon Bushmaster semi-auto AR-15 with 11.5" barrel Vehicle
    Commander and Medic: Stef Surette, Primary weapon 7" barrel full auto AR
    Rear Gunner and Medic: Mark Collen, Primary FN M-249 secondary Bushmaster M-4

    Vehicle Two: Black armored Mercedes automatic transmission Driver: Simon
    Merry, Primary MP-5 secondary Bushmaster M-4 Vehicle Commander: Ian Harris
    Primary Bushmaster M-4

    Vehicle Three: White unarmored BMW automatic transmission Driver: Chris
    Ahmelman MP-5 and M-4 Mission Commander and lead medic: Al Johnson Mission
    Commander, MP-5 and M-4 Rear Gunner: James Hunt II, Primary RPK, Secondary
    FN M-249, and Tertiary an M-4

    All carried Glock model 19s as a sidearm.

    We followed our written S.O.P. in relation to dress which is a locally
    procured ankle length shirt (also known as a "man dress") that had been cut
    off at the waist to make me look like an Iraqi while seated in a car.
    Everyone wore something like that and/or a Shemag (the "rags" locals wear
    on their heads that gets them the "rag head" moniker).
    The mission began at approximately 1125hrs. We departed the Green Zone
    (also known as the International Zone) checkpoint 12 like we do every time
    unless it is closed then we take our singular alternate route out the July
    14th Bridge. The short trip flowed smoothly until we were within
    approximately ½ mile of the relative safety of Camp Victory and BIAP.

    We got stopped in traffic at Rally Point #4 which is the final overpass
    between BIAP and the Green Zone. The U.S. Army had stopped traffic because
    they were at the scene of an I.E.D. (Improvised Explosives Device) that had
    severely damaged a Sport Utility Vehicle. "BIAP Road" is a divided highway
    with a median strip. It is also a limited access road like an American
    Interstate which uses entry and exit ramps for access. There was an
    impromptu stop sign in the middle of our two lane road and orange cones
    letting traffic know to stay well back.

    There was also 2-3 Humvees with at least one of them pointing a .50
    caliber heavy machine gun, which I knew would go through an armored car, in
    our direction to make sure no vehicles got close. Since we had made a
    conscious decision to drive cars that looked like the locals and dress like
    the locals I hesitated to get closer than 200-300 yards. There have been
    more incidents of the Military shooting at PSDs than terrorists which is
    completely understandable because as a group we tend to drive aggressively,
    try to blend in with local vehicles, dress like locals and carry weapons
    often times in plain view if not sticking out of the windows.

    I had moved my rifle from the console to my lap when we stopped. Our cars
    were about 25 yards apart. I watched my "Area of Responsibility". As the
    driver of vehicle one I had to watch from my seat's 12 o'clock counter
    clockwise around to 8 o'clock. Jay Hunt, who was the rear gunner in vehicle
    three, had the largest area to watch from the vehicle's 9 o'clock around to
    the 3 o'clock.

    While we sat in traffic our Team Leader (One I.C.) and lead Medic "Johno"
    fired multiple bursts from his MP-5 submachine gun from vehicle three. He
    got outside the car to do it at least once. My estimation is 3-4 bursts of
    3-4 rounds each. He did this to "warn them off" (cars) in the rear because
    they were getting too close. Johno's area of responsibility was not the
    rear. The rear was Jay's responsibility. Johno was neglecting his 12
    o'clock to 3 o'clock position. Each time he fired his weapon he was drawing
    unwanted attention our way and not watching his side of the car. His side
    of the car is the one in which our attack came from minutes later.

    After his second burst I removed my "Haji dress" because there was
    nothing between those U.S. Army .50 caliber heavy machine guns and us and I
    didn't want them to look down the road at the gunfire and see all of us
    wearing local clothing to include Shemags and engage us. Besides my fear of
    being shot by the U.S. Military, after Johno began shooting, I assumed the
    cars near us knew we were Contractors anyway. Our "cover" if we ever had
    one was now non-existent.
    After being directly under the overpass for several moments (maybe 10) we
    pulled forward about 100 meters to where the final on-ramp to BIAP Road
    entered. I pulled my number one vehicle far right, as instructed by my team
    leader Stef, to block traffic from coming onto the roadway. After about
    10-15 minutes I took the car out of gear and pulled on the emergency break
    because my calf was beginning to ache. I would end up regretting that

    To our right was a "frontage" road or "slip" road about 75-100 yards out
    that ran parallel to BIAP Road. There were houses just on the other side of
    that road. After a few moments one of the guys (I think commander of
    vehicle two: Ian Harris) spotted a small white sedan on the slip road. He
    asked that someone look at it with binoculars. We didn't have any but Mark
    had a telescopic sight on his rifle. He stated it was parked and the sole
    occupant was talking on the phone, wasn't paying attention to us, and
    wasn't a threat. I said aloud "He is a ****ing Dicker." (Dicker is what the
    Brits call a "lookout".) My car commander Stef, who heard me, never
    About three to five minutes after we saw the Dicker (approximately 1350
    hrs) I heard another volley of fire and I thought to myself "What the ****
    is Johno shooting at NOW?!" I felt rounds hitting the car and I heard the
    distinctive supersonic crack of a round pass through our car, inches in
    front of my face, from right to left missing Stef and

    I. Stef yelled "I'm hit!" and he began emptying a 30 round mag out his

    I need to mention at this point that both of the other guys in my car saw
    a large white SUV with black tinted windows rolling slowly down the
    frontage road heading the same direction we were pointing. They apparently
    drove a short distance and whipped into an intersection, did a u-turn, and
    stopped momentarily pointing their vehicle in our direction. This event
    took several minutes. Mark later said that the passenger window was down in
    the SUV but he could not see inside and he kept looking in other directions
    because he didn't consider the vehicle to be a threat. There were two other
    people with the area of responsibility in which the attack came from in
    vehicles two and three and NOBODY reported ANYTHING.

    After I went through my O.O.D.A. Loop (please search Google for OODA
    Loop and Col. John Boyd for more info) I punched the gas to the floor and
    the engine raced but the car wouldn't move. I thought it had it been
    knocked out of commission. After what seemed like an eternity, but was a
    couple of seconds, I grabbed the door handle and began implementation of
    our ambush S.O.P. for a disabled car in which the first step is getting out
    of the car. I remembered I was in a stick shift that was in neutral with
    the emergency brake on as I hit the ground, and the point of no return, and
    moved to the rear wheel. I not sure how long it takes to empty a 30 round
    magazine on full auto but I began firing before Stef emptied his gun the
    first time.
    As I shot from the rear of the car I wanted to kill the terrorists but
    nobody had told me the direction (I figured that one out on my own),
    description, or distance. I fired because I have been trained to fire when
    someone is shooting at me. If I couldn't make hits I was sure going to make
    noise. Half the distance to the slip road there were some Hesco barriers
    and dirt was flying off the top of them. I thought maybe Stef had seen
    someone behind them and was shooting at them. I now realize it was merely
    rounds from our team being shot without using the sights. At the time I
    didn't know and because there were houses directly beyond that it was the
    safest place for me to shoot. I shot about 6-10 aimed rounds into the
    barriers utilizing my EOTech weapon sight.

    I felt Mark coming out of the rear door so I began the next phase of our
    S.O.P. which is getting away from the car (getting off the "X") because
    people tend to shoot at cars and rifles easily penetrate them. I turned and
    ran toward the median which was about 40 feet to the edge. I got face down
    on the edge of the asphalt, took a firing position, and yelled "MOVE!" to

    I am sure Mark had trouble hearing me as he fired the M-249 across the
    back of vehicle one. I pulled my rifle to my cheek, looked through my
    EOTech again, scanned the roof tops and almost shot some clothes hanging
    off a TV antenna to dry. Nobody was there. I scanned the windows of the
    houses. I KNEW I heard a PKM and I KNEW the PKM was hitting us well and was
    most likely in a static position. I scanned the Hescos again. Nothing.
    "Where the **** is it?" I wondered as I searched. I began aiming between
    the windows of the houses and shooting the solid brick walls. Although I
    didn't know who I needed to kill I knew they were that direction
    "somewhere". I felt useless but I thought I might be able to keep their
    heads down. Mark's 249 went down (broken or bent belt) and I fired while he
    grabbed his M-4.

    "****!" I thought to myself. I had forgotten to deploy a smoke grenade.
    When Mark resumed firing I ripped it out of the pouch, peeled off the
    100mph tape, put the spoon in the palm of my hand, straightened the ends of
    the pin out, and pulled the ring. I kept thinking about my Instructor
    course for and teaching the proper deployment of flashbangs, smoke, and CS.
    My mind was racing. I forced myself to focus. I wanted to obscure Mark and
    Stef and so I heaved the high concentration smoke as hard as I could and
    managed to get it on the far side of their car.

    While this was happening I heard sporadic outgoing gunfire from cars two
    and three, I wasn't sure which vehicles but I was glad to hear them
    shooting because I knew they were alive. I was hoping that cars two and
    three were communicating and covering each other. Mark and I were filling
    in each others gaps of fire.

    I thought my magazine was nearing empty and while Mark was firing I took
    the time to do a tactical reload on my rifle and get my bearing. I looked
    to my rear and the opposite side of the road and it was all clear. I looked
    on the overpass and it was all clear. I looked at car number three and I
    saw Jay Hunt with blood all over his crotch. I heard him tell Johno "I'm
    hit in the femoral buddy." very calmly. He slid himself toward the front of
    the car so that Johno could apply first aid from behind the engine which
    was the safest spot. I looked at Chris. He was still in the driver's seat
    slumped lifelessly to the left against the door.
    I checked car two, the armored Mercedes, Simon and Ian were uninjured
    and now in the fight. I was glad to see them. Although Simon got out with
    an MP-5 and he quickly discarded it with for an M-4. I was glad to see that
    as well. I looked at car one and saw Stef was out of the car but he was
    going down. Although I knew he told me he was hit he had still been in the
    fight and got out of the car under his own power. I did not realize the
    extent of his injuries.

    I began speaking to Simon who was the closest to me. The next phase of
    our S.O.P. was, if the cars were down, to commandeer a vehicle from the
    opposite side of the road, load the dead and wounded, and escape. I asked
    Simon, who was the closest to me, if he wanted to help me get a couple of
    cars. He was drawn back into the chaos in front of him and never responded.
    I yelled "WHO ARE WE SHOOTING AT!?!" as loud as I could to nobody in
    particular and got no reply.

    Ian and Simon were now communicating with Mark. Mark has asked them to
    move the armored car, vehicle two, up for cover so he can attend to Stef's
    injuries. Ian at some point here ran to vehicle one and began covering
    Mark. Simon tried to move vehicle two but it barely limped forward. It was
    not moved into a position to cover Mark and Stef. Simon got out and moved
    up to vehicle one and provided cover for Mark. Since I was not actively
    shooting at the terrorists I was still searching the areas the guys are NOT
    shooting at so we have full 360 degree security.

    I now know that Mark has assistance and if Simon and Ian cannot help him
    that there is certainly nothing I can do for him. I shift my attention to
    Johno who is alone at vehicle three. He is now working on Jay's injuries
    frantically and calling for help. I run to him. When I get there I can tell
    Johno is trying to cover his 360 and work on Jay at the same time. Jay was
    still breathing but his respirations were becoming labored. I reassured
    Johno that I had him protected as I scanned the area. After a few moments a
    car drove toward us from the rear. I waive them off but they do not stop. I
    fired twice and they stopped.

    Johno tells me he is out of bandages. I motion toward my medical pouch
    and he grabs one of mine. He didn't realize it, and I didn't think to tell
    him, but I had a packet of TraumaDEX in the pouch as well. I could hear the
    Humvees driving up from the BIAP end of the road (the direction we were
    traveling) and the Soldiers talking to the others. I was relieved to
    finally know we had help. Johno and the medic asked for help removing Jay's
    Paraclete Releasable Assault Vest. I reach over and yank the ripcord off
    and the vest fell off allowing the ready access.
    Almost simultaneously I see a man walking toward us from the opposite
    direction. He is white and dressed like a PSD operator although he was
    wearing no armor and carried no weapon. I find out later he works for U.K.
    based Olive Security. I yell to him "DO YOU HAVE ANY BANDAGES!?!" he holds
    up his finger in a "wait a minute" fashion as he strolls my way. I yell
    louder "DO YOU HAVE ANY BANDAGES!?!" He replies with what I think was an
    Australian accent "Can we drive through?" I was stunned, simply stunned,
    that he had the NERVE to ask to drive through. He was within 20 feet now
    and I said "DO YOU HAVE ANY ****ING BANDAGES!?!" He ignored me and walked
    past to one of the just arriving U.S. Soldiers and asked if he could drive

    The Soldier asked "Do you have an SUV?" The man replied "Yes. Can I
    drive through?" The Soldier said "Get your SUV up here and put that body in
    it. (Pointing to Chris)" He replied "But we are in a terrible hurry!" The
    Soldier said "Do it now." In a much more pleasant tone than I thought the
    man deserved. The man began to protest and the Soldier clearly, firmly, and
    loudly stated "DO YOU HAVE A D.O.D. CARD?!" The man replied "Yes." The
    S.U.V. UP HERE AND LOAD UP THAT BODY…NOW!!!!" He finally complied and
    meandered back toward his truck obviously put off.

    The soldier told me to get Chris' body from the driver's seat. Johno and
    a military medic worked on Jay as I opened the door and caught Chris. He
    had begun to fall out. It happened very quickly from here but the car,
    which was an automatic, was still in gear and when I pulled Chris out the
    car began rolling away toward Jay. If Johno had not reacted quickly Jay
    would have been crushed by the car. I had to drop Chris' body and run
    around the opposite side of the car to get inside. Luckily a soldier on the
    other side was able to get in and switch it off before it crashed into a
    Humvee that was backing up to avoid the collision.
    Jay and Stef were attended to by military medics and were rushed to the
    closest medical facility at Camp Victory. Johno and the Olive PSD team
    loaded Chris' body in the back of their SUV and followed. The 4 uninjured
    survivors (Ian, Simon, Mark, and I) got into all three vehicles and drove
    toward the Camp Victory entrance as commanded by the Military. The armored
    Mercedes sustained enough damage from the gunfire that it could not move
    the few hundred yards to the checkpoint. We abandoned it on the roadside.

    Other Details

    Everyone that was wounded was wounded by the initial volley of gunfire.
    Stef and Jay both received wounds to their pelvic / upper thigh region that
    severed their femoral arteries upon the initial contact. Even though they
    were injured they stayed in the fight. I am unable to assess how many
    rounds Jay actually fired but it was several. Stef emptied a 30 round
    magazine (loaded with 28) and reloaded and fired an unknown number of
    rounds from the second magazine.

    I never knew during the firefight which vehicle (or house, or person,
    etc) was shooting at us and I was the first one in position to deliver
    accurate, sustained, and deadly return fire and I didn't know where to aim
    my gun. I received no serious injuries.
    Mark fired with the FN M-249 until it stopped functioning. He estimates
    he got 60-80 rounds through it first. He switched to his M-4 and fired as
    well. I am not sure if he ever reloaded the M-4. He received no serious

    Simon was the driver of car number 2 I feel as if he should have been
    watching the same areas as me and therefore never would have seen the SUV
    and might not have been told either. He had an MP-5 in his lap but he
    switched to an M-4 shortly after the gunfire erupted. He never had a target
    and never fired. He received no serious injuries. Ian never had to reload
    his M-4. He received no serious injuries.

    Johno emptied a full magazine in his MP-5 and reloaded one time. He was
    shot through his left buttock and was still providing Jay with care. Johno
    and I expended all our bandages on our person and from his back pack trauma
    kit just caring for Jay. Later the doctors at the medical center would say
    that Mark and Johno did an outstanding job.

    Johno was the mission Commander, Ian was second in command, and Stef was
    third. Nobody was giving any clear commands so in the end I just filled in
    gaps to the tactical jigsaw puzzle the best I could.

    Chris was wounded through the leg first and instead of moving off the "X"
    he spent the last seconds of his life telling Johno about it while he took
    another round through his throat and one through his head.

    We had two unarmored cars and one armored car. All injuries came from
    within the unarmored cars. Both of the unarmored cars, while hit multiple
    times, were never disabled. Although the rounds that impacted the passenger
    compartment of the armored car did not penetrate, the transmission/engine
    was destroyed as well as the fuel tank being ruptured.

    As soon as our group started shooting the terrorists became disinterested
    in staying in the fight which is their modus operandi.

    There was never a point during the incident where I was affected by any
    of the mental affects of adrenaline like auditory exclusion or tunnel
    vision. The reason I point this out is because apparently Olive Security
    told our team they fired at the SUV. Not only do I not remember seeing or
    hearing it happening you cannot hear their "7.62" on our video.

    I had the least amount of time in the Middle East of anyone on that
    mission. I have no time in the military; I was a 12 year Cop. My bio is on
    my website for anyone who wants to read it http://www.tacticalresponse.com/

    "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his
    friends" -John 15:13
    There is an AAR separate from this document.
  19. LeMat

    LeMat New Member

    Reading through that, I kept telling myself that this guy must have never served a day in the military as that is the biggest joke of an AAR I have ever read.

  20. deathkricket

    deathkricket New Member

    I was not going to waste my time commenting on this but what the hell. To start with there is nothing tactical about his response. Being stationed on the bases he was talking about traving the same MSRP they got hosed on right about the same time I will add a few things here.

    Mistake one:
    If your *** is not in a military vehicle, Do not get out and fire your gun to warn traffic off, you WILL piss off the wrong person.

    Mistake two:
    Upon taking heavy (PKM) fire you should immediatly break contact (if you need help breaking contact please consult wiki)

    Mistake three:
    Panicking like a school girl and jumping out the car dumping at roof tops wanting to "kill the terrorist" (9 times out of 10 you will not see who is shooting at you, we lost a SSG this same way)

    The AAR should read something like this:

    Jumped out of the car shaking our balls and shooting our guns.

    Pissed someone off who called up his "terrorist friends" and we got shot the f__K up. (you are in their home town after all)

    Did not have the proper knowledge to handle the situation and had to wait for someone who did keep their calm to direct us.

    It is well known PSD's do not have the most steller record, that is nothing new and seeing them work first hand will amaze you at the "boys club" mentality.

    I have had one before tell me to unload my 249 during convoy security before and when I asked why he replied he would keep me safe and didn't want me getting hurt, I told him I'll take my chances with my 249 over his Bushmaster any day of the week.

    Proper way to handle this situation:

    Upon taking gunfire break contact.

    If a vehicle is disabled pop smoke lay cover fire, move to remaining good vehicles and get out of dodge.

    None of this is hard if you have had proper training and will be second nature when you start recieving gun fire, a and many of PVT's do this without thinking.

    Just my 2 cents.
    Last edited: Nov 21, 2013