[Dillinger]

Executive Summary

In May 2004, approximately 20 British troops in Basra were ambushed and forced out of their vehicles by about 100 Shiite militia fighters.

When ammunition ran low, the British troops fixed bayonets and charged the enemy. About 20 militiamen were killed in the assault without any
British deaths.

The bayonet charge appeared to succeed for three main reasons:

First, the attack was the first of its kind in that region and captured the element of surprise.

Second, enemy fighters probably believed jihadist propaganda stating that coalition troops were cowards unwilling to fight in close combat, further enhancing the element of surprise.

Third, the strict discipline of the British troops overwhelmed the ability of the militia fighters to organize a cohesive counteraction.

The effects of this tactical action in Basra are not immediately applicable elsewhere, but an important dominant theme emerges regarding the need to avoid predictable patterns of behavior within restrictive rules of engagement.

Commanders should keep adversaries off balance with creative feints and occasional shows of force lest they surrender the initiative to the enemy.

I. Overview of Bayonet Charge

On 21 May 2004, Mahdi militiamen engaged a convoy consisting of approximately 20 British troops from the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders 55 miles north of Basra.

A squad from the Princess of Wales regiment came to their assistance. What started as an attack on a passingconvoy ended with at least 35 militiamen dead and just three British troops wounded.

The militiamen engaged a force that had restrictive rules of engagement prior to the incident that prevented them from returning fire. What ensued was an example of irregular warfare by coalition troops that achieved a tactical victory over a numerically superior foe with considerable

firepower.

I have the full "Spirit of the Bayonet" Un-Official Release ( Leaked ) from the Urban Warfare Analysis Center if anyone is interested in reading the whole experience and what the Analysis Center had to say. It's about 8 .pdf pages, but it's a good read.

Let me know if interested...

JD

[CA357]

Thanks for posting this. It clearly illustrates how restrictive rules of engagement have hamstrung troops. (ours and coalition)

I have a number of well made and useful knives. They vary in size and purpose, but all are excellent quality.

[Kill-Zone]

The RULES OF ENGAGEMENT changes when the Tomahawk is un-sheathed....Can you say BLOODBATH ?

[Benning Boy]

Couple of thoughts, invite discussion.

1) When I got to my first duty assignment, first thing I bought was a knife. The next day, there was a battalion barracks search for knives. "Rambo" style knives were confiscated, and we were told that knives with saw serrations on the back violated the Geneva Convention, since they could cut bone. Sounded like hooey to me.

2) Bayonets tend to be dull, since a cut with a sharp knife tends to heal better, and a dull one "tears", making a jagged, nasty wound.

3) Best knife I had while I was in was essentially a modified bayonet that I had some custom work done on. Indestructible. When I left, gave it to my buddy. What an idiotic move, as I've yet to find this knife's match.

4) For me, at least, the bayonet course was the roughest and scariest part of boot camp. As close as you can come to true barbarism in training. God, I miss it.

[cpttango30]

I remember when I showed up to formation with a 7" Gerber double edge knife hanging off my LBE my squad leader about SHP when he asked me what that was and I unsheathed it and the blade edge was gleaming in the moonlight. That sucker was so sharp you could shave with it. That knife helped save the lives of three men in a very bad military truck accident that happend to my unit at NTC.